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Confused Culpability, Contrived Causation,
and the Collapse of Tort Theory
Larry Alexander & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan

What justifies tort law? Once we identify a domain that is central to if not co-extensive
with “torts,” we will find that it consists of a motley collection of doctrines that are impossible to
justify under any recognizable and attractive normative principles.
I.

The Target Field
If one looks inside a standard torts casebook, one finds a vast and quite variegated

collection of cases. Nevertheless, all torts casebooks do contain two groups of cases with the
following characteristics: (1) In both groups, the plaintiff has claimed that his person has been
(or will be) injured, his property damaged, or his livelihood adversely affected by defendant’s
conduct, conduct that does not involve a breach of contract or of trust. (2) In one group, the
defendant has claimed that he did not mean to injure, damage, or adversely affect plaintiff’s
interests, nor was he aware of an unjustifiable risk that his conduct would do so. (3) In the other
group, defendant was either aware of an unjustifiable risk that his conduct would adversely affect
plaintiff’s interests or acted with the purpose of adversely affecting those interests. (4) In both
groups, the plaintiff is seeking monetary compensation for that injury or damage.
Can cases in those two groups be explained and justified by attractive normative principles?
To answer, one ought to take into account other mechanisms for dealing with loss and
culpability. Tort law functions in a rather ad hoc manner, only repairing losses caused by other
humans and not losses caused by Mother Nature, and imposing liability on those who cause harm
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and not those who merely risk it.1 We think that an insurance scheme, coupled with
administrative regulations and the criminal law, may be a better mechanism.
II.

Is There a Duty in the House?
We agree with Greg Keating that tort law cannot be explained and justified without locating

some duty that defendant has breached that accounts for why he and not others—or the plaintiff
himself—must compensate plaintiff for plaintiff’s losses in those cases in which the plaintiff
prevails. What is it about defendant that justifies plaintiff collecting from him? Providing
recourse to an injured plaintiff does not explain and justify giving plaintiff recourse against
defendant. Nor does invoking “corrective justice” tell us why it is “just” in any sense of just for
defendant to be held liable.2
But what would account for plaintiff’s claim against defendant for compensation? For
Keating and for us, the most obvious candidate would be that defendant breached a duty toward
plaintiff that resulted in plaintiff’s loss.
Coming up with a duty that defendants have breached in these cases is no easy task,
however. Remember, in one group of cases the defendant acted without intending to harm
plaintiff’s interests and without adverting to an unjustifiable risk to those interests that his
conduct was creating. Let us look at such cases to see if we can locate a breach of duty.
A.

A Duty Not to Cause Harm?

If we had a duty never to cause harm to others’ interests, we would have made some
progress in locating the duty we need. But such a duty can neither explain nor justify the case
results.
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See Ronen Avraham & Issa Kohler-Hausmann, “Accident Law for Egalitarians,” 12 Legal Theory 181 (2006).
On these points, see Gregory C. Keating, “The Priority of Respect Over Repair,” 18 Legal Theory 293 (2012). The
law and economics, cheapest cost-avoider, approach is not duty-based but rather is an ex ante insurance, not an ex
post damage, approach.
2
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To begin with, if there were such a duty, we would be hard pressed to explain all those
cases in which the defendant was held to have caused plaintiff’s losses but in which defendant
prevailed. There are many such cases and countless that are never litigated because the plaintiff
knows he will not prevail.
It seems doubtful those cases are all incorrect. One reason it should be doubtful is the
Coasean point that plaintiff’s injuries have also been caused by his conduct.3 Indeed, if plaintiff
recovers, defendant’s resulting loss has been caused by plaintiff’s acts of, say, using defendant’s
product, or driving on the same road as defendant, plus his act of suing defendant.
There are other reasons aside from the Coasean such “strict liability” cannot be justified.
Richard Epstein’s argument in favor of strict liability on the ground that it followed logically
from plaintiff’s entitlement to his life, bodily integrity, and property was question begging.4 For
the question can be reposed: why do plaintiff’s entitlements extend to entitlements to be
compensated for accidental damage, and why is defendant not entitled to secure his property
against accidental damage claims by plaintiffs? There is no good answer to these questions.
B. A Duty Not Cause Harm Through “Faulty” Conduct?
In a large number of cases in the torts casebooks, plaintiff recovers his losses from
defendant because the trier finds that defendant caused plaintiff’s losses through faulty conduct.
For many, the fact that defendant’s conduct was faulty justifies making defendant, and not
others, pay for plaintiff’s losses.
But what kind of fault is exhibited by defendant’s conduct in these cases? It cannot be this:
(1) that had defendant not acted exactly as he did, plaintiff would not have suffered the losses he
suffered; and (2) that the social benefits (however calculated) of defendant’s acting exactly as he
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Ronald H. Coase, “The Problem of Social Cost,” 3 J. Law and Econ. 1 (1960), 2.
Richard A. Epstein, “A Theory of Strict Liability,” 2 J. Legal Stud. 151 (1973).
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did were not sufficient to justify plaintiff’s losses. Even leaving aside the problematic
counterfactual in (1) —a point we shall return to later in this chapter—(1) and (2) are present
even in those cases in which plaintiff lost because the court did not find defendant to have been
at fault. In other words, leaving aside cases in which defendant’s act was a justifiable one on the
condition that he pay for any damage it causes—cases that can be considered a species of private
eminent domain—in the bulk of cases meeting conditions (1) and (2) , the plaintiff will lose.
What condition in addition to (1) and (2) is required for “fault” to exist? Remember, we are
not at this point dealing with a defendant who is conscious of an unjustifiable risk to plaintiff’s
person or property, or who intends to injure plaintiff’s person or property. We are dealing with
defendants who have not adverted to those conditions that were present when they acted and the
presence of which in conjunction with defendant’s act brought about plaintiff’s injuries or
property damages.

1. What is the fault in not adverting?
The orthodox doctrinal response is that defendant’s “fault” in these cases was his failure to
alter his conduct because he was not adverting to those harm-causing conditions that were
present when he acted as he did. But what kind of fault is not adverting?
First, it is worth noting that in some pockets of tort law, even the most ardent proponents of
the reasonable person test for fault must admit that their test amounts to a form of strict liability.
This is because when the defendant is held to an objective standard that he utterly lacks the
capacity to meet, he is not demonstrating any fault on his part.5 When being the best that you
can be is simply not good enough for tort law, there’s a name for that—strict liability.6

5
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See, eg, Vaughan v. Menlove, (1837) 132 E.R. 490.
See also Avihay Dorfman, “Reasonable Care: Equality as Objectivity,” 41 Law & Phil. 369 (2012).
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Second, we see the problem as going beyond these handful of examples. Consider two
cases:
Hard Worker
Kimberly has an important job and has been asked to write a legal memorandum by the end
of the week. She works through lunch and leaves the office to drive home at 7:30 p.m.
Because she is still deep in thought, because she has been looking at a computer screen all
day, and because her blood sugar is low from not eating, she mistakenly interprets the light
as a green light for her. She hits the accelerator and collides with another car.
Excellent Driver
Mike reads a scientific article that discusses the strength of peripheral vision and becomes
convinced that reading the newspaper while driving is not problematic. Mike reads the
paper while driving and rear-ends a car that he failed to see had braked.
Kimberly and Mike each get the Learned Hand Carroll Towing7 formula wrong. Kimberly
fails to run the formula at all because she never sees the risk. Mike, we shall assume, is falsely
confident in his abilities and therefore discounts the probability of harm to a point at which his
running the risk is justified under the Hand formula. Indeed, this is why the Hand formula is not
a test for inadvertent negligence. Rather, that test posits a defendant who weighs the costs and
benefits of an act, finds that the costs outweigh the benefits, and then despite this chooses to
engage in that act. Such a defendant would indeed be culpable, but he would be culpable because
he is consciously disregarding an unjustifiable risk. He is reckless, not inadvertently negligent.
(The inadvertently negligent actor is not adverting to the Hand formula’s costs and benefits; and
the costs and benefits of uncovering the true costs and benefits do not appear to him to be Handformula cost-justified.)8
Tort law would find that both of these individuals are “at fault,” but wherein does the fault
lie? In our book on criminal law theory, we devoted a chapter to establishing the proposition that
7

United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F. 2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
A more complete discussion of this problem of non-actuarial risks is found in Larry A. Alexander, “Causation and
Corrective Justice: Does Tort Law Make Sense?,” 6 Law & Phil. 1 (1987), 18–23.
8
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merely not adverting to dangerous aspects of one’s conduct is not culpable.9 In the criminal law
context, theorists have struggled in their attempts to drive a wedge between Kimberly, whom
many theorists think should not be held criminally responsible, and Mike, whom many think
should be responsible, allegedly because he manifests an indifference to others that Kimberly
does not.10 We reject that distinction, but no matter; for tort law makes Kimberly pay, too. But
why?
As we noted in our book, “an actor may fail to form a belief (or a correct belief) if he (1)
lacks the requisite background beliefs, (2) lacks the intellectual ability, or (3) lacks the
motivation to form the belief.”11 Michael Moore and Heidi Hurd have identified those capacity
defects as motor control defects, cognitive defects, conational defects, and motivational
deficiencies.12 As they clearly elucidate, anytime we wish to say that someone could have
adverted, what we are saying is that the actor would have adverted if some condition C. The
moral work, then, is done by articulating why the lack of C is blameworthy. (We assume that
tort law does not mean “fault” as simply in some way faulty or deficient, but means to carry
some suggestion of moral blame, and thus must show why the failing in question is
blameworthy.)
These failings themselves, however, may not be “faulty.” Even if it is true that Kimberly
could have adverted to the red light had some condition not been present that was present,
wherein lies the fault in her perceptual failure? Even if it is true that Mike could have correctly
appraised the chance of an accident had he had a lower opinion of his abilities, wherein lies the
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See Larry Alexander and Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Crime and Culpability: A Theory of Criminal Law (2009), ch.
3.
10
See, eg, Peter Westen, Individualizing the Reasonable Person in Criminal Law, 2 Crim. L. & Phil. 137 (2008).
11
Alexander and Ferzan, Crime and Culpability, 83.
12
Michael S. Moore & Heidi M. Hurd, “Punishing the Awkward, the Stupid, the Weak, and the Selfish: The
Culpability of Negligence,” 5 Crim. L. and Phil. 147 (2011).
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fault in having a high opinion of his driving skill and perceptual abilities? Unless tort law aims to
be an ad hoc redistributive system whereby when one’s perceptual or intellectual mechanisms
falter and cause harm, one’s goods are simply redistributed to another human being, tort law
must explain wherein the fault in having the faulty mechanism lies.
Moreover, when there is fault, it is because we can point to a prior point in time when the
actor made a deliberate choice. That is, we can trace the present defect to an earlier act of
recklessness—a conscious decision to take an unjustified risk. But tort law never directly
focuses on these upstream measures, nor does it ever assess whether those upstream measures
would have been reasonable to take. What would Kimberly have had to forgo (1) to write a note
to remember to eat, and (2) to take that lunch break? She clearly would have done less work,
and important work at that. What should Mike have done to assess the validity of the scientific
study he read or to evaluate further his perceptual abilities? And why would Kimberly and Mike
believe they needed to do these things? After all, if you believe the risk created by your act is X,
and X is low enough to make your act justifiable, what reason do you have to desist and
investigate further? Desisting and investigating are costly in time and resources. It is true, of
course, that you may discover that the risk of your act is Y, which is higher than X and
sufficiently high to render your act unjustifiable. But it is also true that you may discover the
act’s risk is Z, which is lower than X, rendering the act even more justifiable than you thought.
And there is no probability that you can attribute to discovering that either Y or Z is the case. If
you believe that the risk presented by your act is X, then you must predict that upon further
investigation, the risk will still turn out to be X, and you will have wasted time and resources on
the investigation. If the act turns out to cause damage that could have been averted at a justifiable
cost—if its actual risk of damage was 1, thus higher than X (and Y)—then it is true in one sense
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that defendant’s act, which he thought justifiable, was not justifiable, and he should not have
taken that act. That is the “should” of 20-20 hindsight. And that is really the only “should” that
makes sense in claiming that defendant should have adverted to the higher risk. But the same
“should” is available in the strict liability cases and is not a “should” that suggests any
culpability-reflecting “fault.”
Merely claiming that a “reasonable” and implicitly nonculpable person would have
adverted is not itself an argument that confronts the points that Moore, Hurd, and we have made,
points that can be encapsulated in the observation that we cannot, at the time of action, directly
control to what we are adverting. (We would have to be adverting to that to which we are not
adverting in order to do so.)
Are we inconsistent in deeming actors culpable for their misperceptions of reasons but not
for their misperceptions of risks? If the latter misperceptions are outside of the actor’s control,
are not the former misperceptions as well?
There are deep waters here that we can only dip a toe into in this chapter. A quick
response, which will have to suffice, is that giving the interests of others too little weight—
insufficient concern—just is the basis of culpability. Why the culpable actor gives others’
interests insufficient concern would move the discussion into the heart of the free
will/determinism/moral responsibility debates as well as into the debate over whether
psychopaths, who give others’ interests no weight, can be deemed morally responsible and
culpable. We admit that these issues must be resolved to have a complete account of culpable
acts. We admit also that there are difficult issues raised when actors give others’ interests
insufficient concern because they subscribe to moral norms—norms which activate in them the
reactive emotions of blame, indignation, and guilt—that require insufficient concern for some
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others. (Honor killings may be an example.) Here, we assert only that nonpyschopaths who, in
acting, give others’ interests insufficient weight are culpable and distinguishable from those who
misassess risks.
Finally, some will agree with us that inadvertent negligence is not culpable. Nonetheless,
they will respond that we are wrong to assume that “fault” in tort law is equivalent to culpability,
the concern of criminal law. However, because tort theorists distinguish between fault-based
liability and strict liability, for this criticism to have any traction, there must be a notion of fault
that is neither culpability nor strict liability. In the following section, we deny that possibility.
2. Why negligence is indistinguishable from strict liability
Not only is inadvertent negligence not culpable—or so we contend—but inadvertent
negligence is indistinguishable from strict liability. We have elsewhere argued that the
distinction between negligence and strict liability cannot be maintained because there is no nonarbitrary way to construct the notion of the “reasonable person” who would have adverted to the
risk created by his proposed conduct.13 Here, we want to argue against the distinction between
negligence and strict liability on different, but ultimately related, grounds. We want to argue that
there is no non-arbitrary way to assess the riskiness of conduct ex post that will produce a
negligence-strict liability distinction among those defendants who failed to advert to the risk.14
There is no non-arbitrary way because, ex post, the risk of harm created by conduct is either one
or zero, and neither risk will produce the needed distinction.
To illustrate our point, we offer some cases:

13

See Alexander and Ferzan, Crime and Culpability, ch. 3. See also Larry Alexander, “Reconsidering the
Relationship Among Voluntary Acts, Strict Liability, and Negligence in Criminal Law,” 7 Soc. Phil. & Pol’y 84
(1990).
14
This argument draws from Larry Alexander, “Foreword: Coleman and Corrective Justice,” 15 Harv. J. L. & Pub.
Pol’y 621 (1992), 631–36.
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(1) Nellie, looking for some spices in a cabinet, takes out some rat poison and places it on
a kitchen counter. She is so preoccupied with her cooking that she forgets she has left
the poison there. Later, her three-year-old brother Oscar comes into the kitchen,
thinks the poison is sugar, and eats it, becoming very ill.
(2) Same case as (1), except Oscar slips while he is reaching for the rat poison, hurts
himself, and begins crying. Nellie rushes into the kitchen, where she sees that Oscar
had almost eaten the poison. With a great sense of relief, she puts the poison back in
the cabinet.
(3) The Wrinkled Prune Company sells pitted prunes. Its prunes are pitted by a state-ofthe-art technological process. There is no cost-justified technology or process design
that will guarantee that no pits will remain. Wrinkled puts a notice on every box of its
prunes that warns consumers that some pits may remain.
Paula, a six-year-old, loves to eat prunes. She bites down on one of Wrinkled’s prunes
and breaks a tooth on a pit that had not been removed. A worker at Wrinkled could
have inspected this particular box of prunes for less cost than Paula’s dentist bill.
(4) This case is the same as (3), only Paula discovers the pit before biting down and
avoids injury.
Traditionally, these four cases would be analyzed along the following lines. In case (1),
Nellie was negligent, and her negligence resulted in injury to Oscar. In case (2), she was again
negligent, but her negligence led to no harm. In case (3), in many jurisdictions, Wrinkled would
be strictly liable to Paula because its product, pitted prunes, was defective and caused Paula’s
injury. Wrinkled is not negligent, however, because its process for pitting was cost-justified,
even given the risks of an occasional incompletely pitted prune. In case (4), there is neither
negligence nor strict liability.
Now what were the risks of harm in these cases? Because we are operating ex post, the
answers are easy. In cases (1) and (3), the risk of harm was one. In cases (2) and (4), it was
zero. The actual risks fail to distinguish negligence and strict liability. They distinguish only the
cases of harm from the cases of no harm.
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What if we add the condition that the risks of harm must be unjustifiable if conduct is to be
deemed negligent? That still does not produce the outcomes of the traditional analysis. In case
(3), given that the actual risk of harm to Paula was one, Wrinkled was “unjustified” in not having
a worker inspect the box bound for Paula’s house. Of course, it did not know that particular box
contained an incompletely pitted prune. But neither did Nellie know that she had left the rat
poison out, at least in the sense that she was not adverting to that fact. Moreover, in case (2), the
risk is zero, which can hardly be deemed an unjustifiable risk.
To make the traditional analysis work, we must delete the information about injury that we
possess ex post in such a way as to produce risks in cases (1) and (2) that are between one and
zero, equal to each other, and higher than the risks in cases (3) and (4) (which are also between
one and zero and equal to each other). The problem is how to select which information about the
actual cases to delete.
This is not a problem in cases of recklessness. There, we let the actor’s subjective estimate
of the risk ex ante determine our characterization of his conduct. If he estimates the risk as high,
so high that we would deem taking such a risk unjustifiable, then he is reckless whether the risk
was one or zero (that is, whether the harm risked came to pass).
In cases (1) – (4), however, we cannot avail ourselves of the actor’s ex ante subjective
estimate of risk if we want to produce the traditional outcomes. Nellie undoubtedly believes her
activity, which she would describe as “cooking,” is only minimally risky, because she is unaware
that it includes her leaving rat poison in a place accessible to Oscar. Wrinkled has an ex ante
estimate of the risks of injury to Paula which equals the risks to any consumer of its pitted prunes
chosen at random. By hypothesis, that risk is low and reasonable to impose. The risk is
ascertained by abstracting from the details of all reported cases of incompletely pitted prunes
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information that can serve as the basis for efficient actuarial categories. Thus, the percentage of
prunes that are incompletely pitted and the total damage caused by incompletely pitted prunes
will probably be the only information that is gathered, the more specific details being too
expensive to gather or incapable of affecting Wrinkled’s conduct even if gathered. (An example
of the latter information would be information that consumers are more likely to bite down on a
pit at breakfast, when they are less alert, than at lunch; here, unless the differential risk were
sufficient to warrant a special “breakfast warning,” Wrinkled must lump the risks together.)
The cases of Nellie and Wrinkled resist being distinguished upon close analysis despite the
traditional view that they are different. In all four cases, the actors have in a sense misgauged the
risks. In cases (1) and (3), Nellie and Wrinkled have underestimated the risk—Nellie, because
she views her act as “cooking” rather than as “cooking while leaving rat poison where Oscar will
eat it”; Wrinkled, because it is not concerned with the risks in any individual case but only with
the average risks in the aggregate. In both cases the actual risk of one could have been reduced
to zero by cost-justified actions, but neither actor was aware of the factors that would justify
those actions. Nellie was unaware that she had forgotten to put the rat poison back in the
cabinet. Wrinkled was not aware that the box bound for Paula contained an incompletely pitted
prune. So although Nellie and Wrinkled believed that their conduct was risky, but justifiably so
under the description “cooking” and “selling prunes pitted by a particular process,” both were
unaware that their conduct caused a risk of one under the descriptions “cooking (or selling
prunes) under the circumstances that actually exist in these cases.” Likewise, in cases (2) and
(4), where no harm occurs, Nellie and Wrinkled have overestimated the risk in the particular
circumstances.
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To summarize the analysis thus far, the risk in every case is actually either one or zero. In
each case there are general features on which the actor will focus to predict a risk of harm that
lies somewhere between one and zero. The actor who predicts a risk that is unjustifiably high
and then proceeds to act is reckless even if the harm risked does not eventuate (the actual risk is
zero). The actor who predicts a low risk—a risk that it is justifiable to take—is not reckless if he
acts. If his prediction is actuarially sound, yet harm eventuates (the actual risk is one), then any
liability he faces is paradigmatic strict liability (for example, our case (3)). This is so even
though in the particular case, acting was not cost-justified. (Wrinkled was not cost-justified in
selling the particular box of prunes to Paula in case (3), or was not cost-justified in failing to
inspect that particular box.)
What if the actor incorrectly underestimates the actuarial risk?15 This may occur when an
act has a general feature or features that lend themselves to determining the actuarial risk, but the
actor is either unaware of those features or is aware of the features but not of the actuarial risk
associated with them. These are the cases of inadvertent negligence, such as Nellie’s leaving the
rat poison within Oscar’s reach (cases (1) and (2)). In these cases we must ask why the actor is
ignorant of the important features or the risks associated with them. And in doing so we repeat
the preceding analysis, only this time we replace risk of harm with risk of ignorance (of features
or risks).16 The risk of ignorance may be either reckless, or it may be cost-justified. (For
example, Nellie may be employing an efficient level of advertence that in cases (1) and (2) just
happened to result in inadvertence to risk.) Or the actor could be ignorant of the risk of
ignorance, in which case the analysis repeats again. Ultimately, we end up with either a reckless
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Here we continue a discussion begun in Alexander, “Causation and Corrective Justice,” 18–23.
See also Mark Grady, “Why Are People Negligent? Technology, Nondurable Precautions, and the Medical
Malpractice Explosion,” 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 293 (1988).
16
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actor or a strictly liable one. Inadvertent negligence breaks down into one of those two
categories; it is not a third category.
True risks—one or zero—do not distinguish within the class of human-caused accidents,
because the risk is always one in those cases. The focus must therefore be on ex ante subjective
estimates of the risk. The subjective estimates may show the action to be ex ante cost-justified
(strict liability) because the action is a particular instance of a general class whose actuarial risk
of harm is low relative to its benefits and the costs of refining the actuarial estimates. The
subjective estimates may show the action to be reckless. Or the subjective estimates may, were
they correct, show the action to be ex ante cost-justified, but they may be incorrect subjective
estimates. In the latter case our focus must switch to the subjective estimate of risks associated
with features of acts, the subjective estimates regarding the degree of confidence warranted in
the subjective estimates of risks associated with features of acts, the subjective estimates of the
benefits of using different actuarial categories, or the subjective estimates of the likelihood of not
adverting to a feature whose associated risk is known. The subjective estimates of those
subjective estimates may either reveal reasonable behavior, and hence strict liability, or reveal
recklessness.
In short, every case of inadvertent negligence—Nellie in cases (1) and (2)—is at bottom
either a case of recklessness or a case of strict liability. And every case of strict liability—
Wrinkled in case (3)—can be viewed as a case of inadvertent negligence if we ignore subjective
estimates of risk and focus on the particulars that make the true risk one.
To the extent that tort law is concerned with deterring culpable behavior and requiring
culpable actors to pay for the damage caused by their acts, both inadvertent negligence and strict
liability are outside its purview. To the extent that tort law is concerned with placing the costs of

14

interactions on those—injurers or injured, third-party insurers or first-party insurers—who
possess actuarial information about risks, providing (cost-justified) incentives to obtain actuarial
information, or effecting distributional patterns and reducing transaction costs (including
litigation costs), cases of both inadvertent negligence and strict liability are within its purview,
although the distinction between them is wholly chimerical and irrelevant. This is why, from an
economist’s view, when strategic concerns relative to the costs and likelihood of proving
negligence in court are put to one side, the choice between a negligence rule and a strict liability
rule is inconsequential: They would lead to exactly the same conduct.
Ultimately, everything comes down to what to do about non-actuarial risks. When we lack
information we cannot act on the information we lack, nor can we assess the value of obtaining
that information. (We must have the information in order to assess the value of obtaining it.)
Ignorance cannot be assigned an actuarial value. Except for reckless, knowing, or intentional
harm causing, all harm-causing results from ignorance of true risk. An actor who acts in the face
of his own estimate of unjustifiably high risks has acted unjustifiably and can be dealt with in the
same manner as are knowing and intentional injurers. But an actor whose ignorance leads him to
assess a risk as sufficiently low to make taking it justifiable is an actor whose liability, if any, is
strict. And when the strict liability attaches to ignorance that, at the level it occurs, cannot be
actuarialized, the case for liability and internalizing costs rather than socializing them cannot rest
on attaching the proper incentives to rational calculation.
We conclude that, limiting ourselves to cases of inadvertent negligence and strict liability,
whatever “fault” is present in the former is also present in the latter, and that form of fault is not
a form of culpability. Any alleged duty to avoid faulty conduct in this sense really boils down to
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a duty not to cause harm, and we have already argued that such a duty cannot be justified and,
moreover, cannot explain torts cases.
C.

A Duty Not to Cause Harm Through Culpable Conduct

There is surely a general duty not to engage in culpable conduct. For us, culpable conduct,
rightly conceived, is conduct that the actor believes imposes risks to others’ legally-protected
interests that are beyond the actor’s ability to reduce once he engages in the conduct in question,
and that are not justified by the reasons that favor the conduct that the actor believes exist.17
Therefore, on our conception of culpable conduct, the actor must be adverting to the relevant
risks and reasons that determine his culpability. The question of whether tort law is an
appropriate means for dealing with culpably caused harms then leads to our second worry—
causation.

III. Causation
For criminal culpability, what happens once the actor engages in culpable conduct—
whether his conduct does or does not cause harm to others’ legally-protect interests—should be
immaterial, or so we have argued elsewhere.18 In the realm of tort law, however, if culpable
conduct does not produce harm to the plaintiff’s legally-protected interests, then no tort has
occurred. So, for purposes of tort law, when we focus on truly culpable conduct, we focus solely
on culpable conduct by the defendant that has resulted in damage to legally-protected interests of
the plaintiff.
The “resulted in” notion is typically cashed out in terms of causation. Defendant’s culpable
conduct must have “caused” plaintiff’s injuries. But this causation relation, without which there

17
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Or might exist, discounted by their improbability as the actor perceives it.
See Alexander and Ferzan, Crime and Culpability ,ch. 5.
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would be no recognizable tort law, has proven to be quite troublesome. If it cannot be adequately
theorized in the context of truly culpable conduct, then tort law in that context cannot be fully
theoretically justified. And if it cannot be theoretically justified when defendant has acted
culpably, then it surely cannot be theoretically justified when defendant’s conduct has displayed
only a nonculpable “fault.”

A.

Problem One: The Mismatch Between Degree of Culpability and Degree of Harm, or
Does Corrective Justice Trump Retributive Justice?

Suppose Ed commits a minimally culpable act, one for which he would deserve only a
smallish penalty—say, a $50 fine. Unfortunately, Ed’s minimally culpable act results in Edith’s
suffering catastrophic losses. Her two children—prodigies with heretofore fabulous earning
capacities—are severely crippled. Her Westminster dog show first-prize winning Papillon is
killed. Her fourteen Picassos are destroyed. Compensating Edith for her losses will bankrupt Ed,
who has been quite prosperous due to having provided many socially valuable products and
services.
Should Ed have to compensate Edith for her losses beyond $50 and his fair share of the
balance? (We leave unstated what that fair share might be.) Tort law says “yes.” If Ed had
intentionally lightly kicked Edith’s shin, a minimally culpable act that Ed expected to cause a
slight momentary pain but no injury, but Edith had the proverbial “eggshell skull” (or shin) and
suffered massive injury or even death, tort law has it that Ed would be on the hook for all the
damage that Edith (or her heirs) suffered.
Is it just that Ed should be impoverished by Edith’s tort suit? Why should not first-party
insurance take over after Ed has paid Edith $50? It would surely be prudent for Edith, if she has
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an eggshell skull, or if she is transporting prodigies, prize-winning Papillons, and Picassos, to
have first-party insurance. After all, if she doesn’t, then she is extremely fortunate if Ed is
capable of giving her full compensation.
Or if first-party insurance seems like an unfair burden to place on Edith, how about social
insurance to cover the balance? Once Ed pays the $50, he has suffered to the extent he deserves
for his culpable act, and he is effectively as innocent as Edith and everyone else.
It is possible perhaps that Ed could purchase liability insurance that covers his culpable
conduct so that he can socialize the risk just as easily as can Edith or the rest of society. So we
might get at the basic issue more easily if we completely eliminate insurance from the picture.
Suppose Ed and Edith are the only two people who exist. The costs of their activities cannot be
spread to others. If Ed’s slightly culpable conduct results in catastrophic losses for Edith, should
Ed have to pay full compensation, or should Ed and Edith have to split the damages after Ed
pays $50? Tort law says Ed must pay full compensation. Perhaps the logic is that if you engage
in culpable conduct, you should bear the full risk of whatever losses result. Some culpable actors
will pay nothing, for the risks they foresee will never materialize. Others will pay amounts that
are proportionate to their culpability. And some, like Ed, will pay amounts greatly in excess of
the risks they foresee. But if you engage in culpable conduct, no matter how minimal your
culpability, you are gambling that the losses that result are no greater than what you deserve to
pay, and that is a gamble that you may lose big time.
We are not going to contest tort doctrine on this point. For we are dealing by hypothesis
with truly culpable conduct. Yet tort law extends its “eggshell skull” and other doctrines of
cataclysmic damages to conduct that is “faulty” but not culpable. And even if it is fair to impose
the risk of cataclysmic damage awards on the minimally but truly culpable, it seems ludicrous to
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assert that it is also fair to impose that risk on the nonculpable—the stupid, the ignorant, the
forgetful, and so on. For however “faulty” their conduct is in some sense, it is not truly culpable.
Nor is it distinguishable from the harm-producing conduct involved in cases of strict liability.
So we conclude that tort doctrine gives the wrong verdict in cases of catastrophic injury
when the defendant’s conduct is only “faulty” but not culpable. And we have left unresolved the
question whether tort doctrine has the correct verdict when it is culpable conduct that results in
catastrophic injury—though we are doubtful that it does.
We leave the latter question unresolved because even in cases of truly culpable conduct, we
need to establish that defendant’s conduct resulted in plaintiff’s injuries. In other words, we need
to link plaintiff’s injuries to defendant’s conduct, whether or not that conduct is culpable.
Causation is supposed to be the linkage that we need. But causation as the link between
defendant’s conduct and plaintiff’s injuries has proved to be quite problematic.
B.

Proximate Causation

Before turning directly to factual causation, we should start with our significant
reservations about proximate causation. Determinations about proximate causation, whether
harms are “foreseeable” or “within the risk” or otherwise attributable to the defendant, are
certainly not metaphysical causation judgments. They are policy judgments about the limits of
liability.19 We will therefore put these questions to the side as we address causation question.
Policy limits are policy limits. (But even policy requires principled arguments that are not
masked as metaphysics.)
Moreover, recently, Michael Moore’s extensive study of the metaphysics of causation has
sought to replace proximate causation with a more nuanced understanding of causation itself.20
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He parses what we think of as causation into counterfactual dependence and true causation. He
argues that both of these concepts are scalar. He dispenses with foreseeability (as it crucially
depends on the description of the harm, and there is no principled method for selecting that
description)21 and harm within the risk (as all harms that do or might occur are within the risk, a
point to which we will return below). Moore then recasts the only remaining usage for
proximate causation—for when truly culpable actors (intentional, knowing, or reckless actors)
cause harm in a manner that they did not foresee—as questions of culpability, not causation.
Notably, this final arbiter of responsibility (a view we call below the “mechanism within the
plan”) is unavailable in cases of negligence and strict liability, and therefore outside the arsenal
of tort theory, because in those cases there is no plan.
Before leaving the policy decision masked as causation, it is worth making one final
observation about a rather odd discontinuity in tort law. If John rear-ends Jerry’s car, and Jerry
is an “eggshell skull” plaintiff, then as discussed in the previous section, despite the lack of
foreseeability and so forth, John is on the hook for the full scope of Jerry’s damages. But if John
drives negligently, but the way that Jerry’s harms occur is as unforeseeable (whatever that may
mean) as Jerry’s eggshell status, then John is not responsible for those harms. We fail to see a
principled argument for distinguishing the two; and importantly for our purposes here, if there is
such an argument, it cannot be grounded in the metaphysics of causation. It has to come from
elsewhere.

C.

Counterfactual Dependence

The standard test for whether defendant’s conduct caused plaintiff’s injury is the so-called
“but for” test: If plaintiff would not have suffered injury “but for” defendant’s conduct,
21
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defendant’s conduct is the “cause” of plaintiff’s injuries.22 This test, which Michael Moore labels
counterfactual dependence (CD),23 seems quite intuitive as what we ordinarily mean when we
claim that X “caused” Y’s injuries. Moore doesn’t believe that CD is real causation, but he does
believe that CD is sufficient to make defendant responsible for plaintiff’s injuries.24 (Moore
needs CD to supplement “real” causation as a basis for responsibility because, for example,
“real” causation cannot account for harm resulting from omissions or preventions.)25
CD as the linkage between defendant’s conduct (or omission, prevention, etc.) and
plaintiff’s injuries is, however, beset by several difficulties. We shall leave aside cases of
overdetermination—cases in which there are two or more independently sufficient causes of
plaintiff’s injuries, as when two independently set fires join to burn down plaintiff’s house, and
each would have done so to the same extent at the same time had it been the only fire. There are,
in the literature, ingenious amendments to CD to handle overdetermination cases (though one
might justifiably regard these as ad hoc attempts to save CD from a devastating counterexample,
attempts that in essence concede the inadequacy of CD.)26
We shall also put aside those cases in which defendant’s conduct results in plaintiff’s death
but also results in prolonging his life. (Defendant doctor maliciously gives plaintiff a dose of
radiation that will cause him to die of cancer in 20 years; however, though it does kill plaintiff in
20 years, it also cures an undetected cancer that would have killed plaintiff in one year. Or
prospector B fills prospector C’s canteen with sand, resulting in C’s dying of thirst.
Unbeknownst to prospector B, prospector A had filled C’s canteen with poison, which would
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have killed C much sooner.) The CD test is met: But for defendant’s conduct, plaintiff would not
have died when and how he did. But it is also the case that but for defendant’s conduct, plaintiff
would have died differently but sooner.
One big problem for the CD test is illustrated by cases such as Berry v. Village of Sugar
Notch27. In Berry, recall, the question was whether driving the trolley over the posted speed limit
caused the injury that resulted from a dead tree falling on the plaintiff. The claim was that, “but
for” the speeding, the plaintiff would not have been under the tree at the moment it fell. The
court gave this claim a swift back of the hand. But why?
It might be supposed that one reason for rejecting the claim is that had the motorman’s
conduct been even worse than it was—had he been speeding even more—the tree would not
have fallen on the plaintiff. It would have fallen behind him, just as, had there been no speeding,
it would have fallen in front of him. The problem with this response, however, is that it is often
the case that if defendant’s conduct had been worse than it was, the plaintiff would not have
suffered harm. Had defendant speeded down the residential street at 60 mph and not 50 mph, the
infant whom he struck when the infant crawled into the road from behind a parked car would
have been behind rather than in front of defendant’s car. Such examples are legion.
The other possible defense of Berry is to claim that the speed of the trolley does not affect
the risk of being hit by a falling dead tree. One is just as likely to be struck when the trolley is
traveling at or below the speed limit as when it is traveling above the limit. But this reply, too, is
incorrect in any case, such as Berry, in which plaintiff is hit by a falling tree.
This latter “harm within the risk” (HWR) approach to limiting CD is misconceived for
various reasons. First, risk is an epistemic notion. It is someone’s estimate from some
perspective of the probability of some event’s occurrence given a certain act. “Actual risks” are
27
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either one or zero, depending on what happens. In tort law, the actual risk is always one: for
plaintiff has been injured as a CD result of defendant’s act.
Second, the risks that are relevant to culpable actors are the basket of all the various harms
with their various probabilities that the actor ex ante would estimate. If one takes each discrete
risk separately and is sufficiently fine-grained in describing it, each will be sufficiently
improbable so as to render the defendant’s contemplated act justifiable were it the only risk. The
risk that defendant’s act will cause “bodily injury” or “property damage” may be so high that
defendant would be culpable in imposing that risk. However, the risk that his act will break
plaintiff’s arm exactly three inches above the wrist and cause plaintiff’s car to suffer a precise
amount of damage to the left side passenger door may be tiny from an ex ante perspective (even
though those risks are one ex post).28 All potential harms go into the risk basket that determines
whether defendant was culpable for acting. If defendant has a duty to pen livestock on board his
ship in order to prevent the spread of disease, and if his failure to pen the livestock increases,
however slightly, the chance that the livestock will be swept overboard in a storm, the latter risk
is part of the basket of risks that make defendant culpable. And the same can be said for
negligence; as Moore observes, “once one appreciates that all risks created by a defendant count
in an assessment of negligence, it would appear that any and all harms that materialize from the
defendant’s conduct are within the category of risks that makes such conduct negligent.”29
Suppose one were to respond to the preceding argument by pointing out that if one
compares the reference class “speeding trolleys” with the reference class “non-speeding
trolleys,” the per mile incidence of injuries caused by falling rotting trees is exactly the same for
both reference classes. On the other hand, if one compares those reference classes in terms other
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types of injuries and losses, one will find that speeding trolleys result in more of them per mile
than do non-speeding trolleys. Likewise, no matter how improbable, the incidence of livestock
washed overboard will turn out to be higher if they are unpenned than if they are penned. Thus,
on this reference class interpretation of HWR, Berry is different from the other examples we
gave, and the harm there was not within the risk.
The problem with the reference class approach to HWR is that the selection of the reference
classes is completely arbitrary. If the reference classes are not “speeding trolleys” and “nonspeeding trolleys” but instead are “trolleys travelling at exactly the same speed as Berry’s at
exactly the same place and time, etc.,” and “all other trolley trips,” one would find the incidence
of loss in the former reference class—100%— is much higher than it is in the latter. And the use
of these reference classes is no more arbitrary than the use of “speeding trolleys” and “nonspeeding trolleys.” Remember, we are already assuming the actor is culpable based on the risks
he foresaw. And we are not using reference classes for insurance purposes, which require, for
actuarial data, reference classes defined rather generally. HWR is neither a culpability measure
nor an insurance program.
A second big problem with CD as the linkage between defendant’s conduct and plaintiff’s
injuries is CD’s unlimited scope, its “for want of a nail . . .” aspect. If defendant acts culpably,
the culpable act’s consequences can radiate over space and time without limits. If defendant
culpably threatens plaintiff with a gun, and plaintiff, fearful and anxious to get out of town, buys
a ticket on an airplane that then crashes, plaintiff’s death is linked to defendant’s conduct by CD.
The same is true if defendant culpably drops a brick on plaintiff’s toe, causing plaintiff to go to
the medical clinic, where he is stabbed by a deranged patient. The stabbing is linked by CD to
defendant’s act. And the linkage can be much more remote than that involved in these examples.
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One possible rejoinder here is to claim that CD can be scalar.30 Defendant’s conduct can be
linked by CD to plaintiff’s injuries in a “more of less” fashion.
It is difficult to see how CD can be scalar, however. Something either is or is not a “but for”
cause. If there are to be limitations on CD, they will have to come from something other than
scalarity.
Moore argues that CD’s scalarity is a function of how close are the possible worlds in
which “but for” the defendant’s act, the plaintiff escapes or does not escape injury.31 If there are
only very nearby possible worlds where defendant acts as he actually did and plaintiff is injured,
then defendant is only a little CD responsible for plaintiff’s injuries. On the other hand, if there
are more remote possible worlds in which defendant acts as he actually did and plaintiff is
injured, defendant’s CD responsibility for the injuries is large.
As we said in an earlier article, we find the possible worlds account of CD scalarity
curious.32 Moreover, in order to save CD from affirming recovery in Berry, he has to swallow an
equally unappetizing result in cases of omission liability. For Moore, because he rejects the
possibility of omissions “causing” harm, omitters can only be responsible for harms through CD.
But if CD can be scalar, and that is why the speeding in Berry is not responsible for the harm,
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then parents who omit to feed their child are only a wee bit responsible for the child’s death
through starvation when Aunt Emma would have arrived with food had she not been riding on
the Sugar Notch trolley and knocked unconscious by the falling tree.
If CD is nonscalar, as we believe it must be, then, because it will be present in all cases of
Moore’s true causation—other than the very rare cases of overdetermination of exactly the same
harm at exactly the same time—we will be left with counterintuitive assignments of
responsibility for all harms resulting from culpable acts no matter how remote. The death of the
person who flees the defendant’s beatings by buying a ticket on a plane that crashes will be the
defendant’s responsibility, for CD is present.

D.

True Causation
If liability for harms resulting from culpable acts cannot be limited in cases of CD, can it be

limited in cases of true metaphysical (non-CD) causation?
Moore claims not only that CD is scalar but also that “real” causation is scalar as well. He
analogizes “real” causal chains to the ripples in a pond caused by tossing a pebble into it. The
ripples gradually peter out, and so too does causation.
The idea that the causal linkage between a culpable act and its injurious effects is one of
gradual diminishment seems to work for physical causation. It works less well, if at all, for
culpable acts that cause harm by giving the victims or intermediaries reasons for acting. If the
defendant lures his victim into harm’s way, solicits a hit man to break the victim’s legs, or gives
a letter bomb to the mail carrier with instructions to deliver it to the victim, it is hard to see how
scalarity gets into the picture.
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Take a case of luring. Suppose Defendant wants to kill Victim and knows that the Bridge
of San Luis Rey will collapse under Victim’s weight. Victim is planning to walk to town. One
route takes him across the Bridge. It is longer but more scenic. The other route is shorter and
less scenic. It is a close choice, but ultimately Victim decides to take the shorter route. At this
point, Defendant calls Victim and urges him to take the longer route over the Bridge, offering, as
an inducement, companionship on the walk once Victim crosses the Bridge. That tips the
balance of reasons for Victim in favor of the longer route, and he subsequently plummets to his
death.
Just how much, on a scalar view of causation, is Defendant causally responsible for
Victim’s death? He offered Victim a reason to cross the Bridge, a reason which perhaps was not
terribly weighty but was just weighty enough to shift the balance of reasons in favor of crossing
the Bridge. Is Defendant, therefore, only a small cause of Victim’s death and only minimally
causally responsible for it? How does causation’s scalarity work here?
Or take the letter bomb case. If Unabomber 1, who hatches the plot and builds the bomb,
gives it to his confederate, Unabomber 2, who delivers it to Victim, it would seem to us that
Unabomber 1 is as responsible for Victim’s death or injury as is Unabomber 2. Moore says that
accomplices are less responsible causally than are principals, which would imply that
Unabomber 1 would be less responsible than Unabomber 2.33 And if there were a third
confederate, Unabomber 3, to whom Unabomber 2 delivers the better bomb, Unabomber 1
would be even less responsible for the harms suffered by Victim.
All of this is wildly counterintuitive. To see why, assume Unabomber 1 is the only
culpable actor. He merely gives his letter bomb to an unsuspecting mail carrier, who in turn
hands it over to equally unsuspecting personnel at the local post office, who in turn hand it over
33
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to other unsuspecting postal workers, one of whom ultimately gives it to the Victim. There may
be many innocent actors in the causal chain. We would assume that in such a case—the real one
that occurred—Unabomber 1 would be fully responsible for Victim’s death or injuries. Yet the
causal chain from Unabomber 1’s culpable act to Victim’s injuries is just as attenuated (or not
so) as it is when the intermediaries are in on the plot. Scalarity does not appear to be in play here.
E.

Recasting Proximate Causation as Culpability

If intervening human acts do not break causal chains—and we agree with Moore that they
do not;34 if scalarity does not work as a limitation on responsibility; and, moreover, if nonscalar
CD is omnipresent, then there are no obvious limitations on culpable acts that reduce or
eliminate responsibility for resulting harms. In this final section, we turn to Moore’s last method
for cabining causation by viewing it as culpability.
At the outset, it is worth noting that Moore specifically denies that this approach works for
negligence.35 There is no safe harbor for tort theorists. They will need to come up with a way to
limit causation that neither depends upon metaphysics nor fault.
Back to Moore. We return to an example we have used elsewhere of two Pierres.36 One
Pierre intends to kill Monique with a bullet but misses, with the result that a frightened Monique
runs outside and is killed by lightning. The other Pierre intends to miss Monique with a bullet
and frighten her into running outside in a dangerous thunderstorm, a plan that succeeds. At one
point Moore acknowledges that both Pierres are equally causes of Monique’s death, but are only
“small” causes.
Treating the second Pierre, whose plan succeeded precisely as he intended, as only a small
cause of Monique’s death, and therefore only minimally responsible, seems perverse. And
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indeed Moore introduces a new concept—the “mechanism within the plan” (MWP)—to
distinguish the Pierres in terms of their causal responsibility.37 The second Pierre’s causal chain
satisfies MWP, whereas the first Pierre’s does not.
(Of course, there could be a third Pierre, one who, like the first Pierre, was trying to kill
Monique with the bullet, but who also, like the second Pierre, contemplated the possibility that
the bullet might miss but frighten Monique into running outside and getting struck by lightning.
Would MWP be satisfied with this Pierre? If so, should this slight difference between the first
Pierre and the third in terms of what they contemplated result in a greater causal responsibility
for the latter?)
The problems with MWP as a limitation on either causal or CD responsibility are fatal,
however. First, it is difficult to understand why the content of defendant’s plan, which has
already been factored into his culpability, should then reappear as a limit on causal
responsibility. Why does the first Pierre, who at first seems quite culpable because he intends to
kill, somehow become less culpable when he says, “I intended to kill her and she died, but it
didn’t happen the way I planned.” What is culpability diminishing about that? In addition,
Moore admits, as he should, that defendant’s mental states themselves do not produce effects in
the world beyond their effects on how he acts. There is no telekinesis, says Moore, and we agree.
But if defendant’s mental states themselves are not causes, why are they limitations on causal
responsibility?
Second, for those torts that are based on recklessness, negligence, and strict liability,
defendant’s plan is immaterial. For inadvertent negligence and strict liability, defendant’s mental
state at the time he acts is not material. Recklessness does turn on defendant’s mental state, but
37
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the reckless defendant merely adverts to the basket of risks his act creates and does not involve
any “plan” or specific conception of the many ways those risks might be realized. Recklessness
culpability is awareness based but not plan based.
As we said elsewhere regarding a MWP limitation on recklessness:
Consider People v. Acosta.38 Acosta, driving fast to escape pursuing police
cars and police helicopters, was aware that he was acting in an unjustifiably
risky manner and thus recklessly. Moore would ask whether Acosta was
reckless as to the actual harm he caused (the helicopter crash). Suppose
Acosta considered each risk he was creating in a fine-grained manner,
including the risk of the helicopter crash. And suppose none of those risks
taken individually would render Acosta reckless. Only those risks in the
aggregate would. It would be counterintuitive to say that Acosta was not
reckless with regard to the helicopter crash (or any other harm) even though
that perceived risk, taken in isolation, would not have made him reckless.
And the analysis should not change if Acosta did not individuate the risks in
this fine-grained way but considered his conduct “very risky” in light of the
aggregated various dangers of pursuing helicopters or of the risk they might
crash any more than it would matter that he would have been unaware of the
particular pedestrian whom he might have hit while recklessly speeding.39
We conclude that the quest for principled limitations on causal or CD responsibility has
come up empty. It is not for lack of trying by many able minds. Rather, we think the quest is
doomed to fail. We can assess the defendant’s culpability. And perhaps we can assess whether
defendant’s culpable act was a CD “cause”—though we believe that the CD inquiry may rest on
shaky metaphysical grounds. But if culpability plus CD seems too capacious an ambit of tort
liability, we see no tenable way to limit it.

Conclusion
If there is no fault in not adverting, if there is no principled distinction between negligence
and strict liability, and if there is no principled limit on causation, then nothing cabins the reach
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of tort law. An ad hoc and unprincipled system is simply not the way to run a railroad. It isn’t
even the way to run a trolley system in the Borough of Sugar Notch.
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